Introduction
The Bayesian theory of statistical inference demands a prior distribution for some parameter. The prior represents information available before experimental data became available. Walley (1991) presents a clear and extensive discussion about the major drawbacks of describing a certain amount of information, or lack of information, by a single prior distribution. This leads to a generalization of the concept in which the single prior distribution is replaced by a set of prior distributions, using a generalized concept of probability, imprecise probabilities. Pericchi and Walley (1991) conclude that the intervals of measures method, introduced by DeRobertis and Hartigan (1981) , is the most suitable form for a set of prior distributions in Bayesian inference.
The idea of imprecise probabilities goes back to Boole (1854) , but little attention was paid to it until the contributions of Smith (1961) , who proposed an axiom system for imprecise probabilities (Wolfenson and Fine, 1982) and Good (1962) . Dempster (1968) proposed a framework of statistical inference that leads to unreasonable results in some cases (Walley, 1991;  section 5.13). Walley (1991) provides a thorough mathematical foundation of a coherent theory of imprecise probabilities, where the interpretation of lower and upper probabilities is in terms of betting rates, strongly related to the ideas of de Finetti (1974) .
In his book Walley pays little attention to application of imprecise probabilities to statistical decision theory, in which field the Bayesian concept is attractive (Lindley, 1973) . Other interesting contributions to decision theory with imprecise probabilities are provided by Fishburn (1965) , Sahlin (1982,1983) , Levi (1982) and Wolfenson and Fine (1982) . Smith (1961) also pays attention to decision making. Berger (1985) discusses a method of sensitivity analysis within statistical decision theory, called robust Bayesian inference. This method differs from the theory discussed by Walley (1991) in that Berger does not use imprecision in probabilities as a tool to report the amount of information on which the probabilities are based, the most important reason for introducing the generalization.
While these contributions develop the theory they do not provide an effective basis for use through a method of calculation. All these methods imply an exhaustive process of evaluating a loss function at each decision and for all possible priors.
In this report it is shown that the amount of calculation is less than expected at first sight, when the set of prior probabilities is given through intervals of measures. The results make the practical application of imprecise prior probabilities to decision problems possible. Important additional aspects for such application, e.g. introduction of suitable statistical models and assessment of imprecise prior probabilities, are discussed by Coolen (1992a Coolen ( ,b,1993 .
In section 2 of this report Bayesian decision theory with imprecise prior probabilities is introduced and the restriction to intervals of measures is suggested. In section 3 results are given for possible practical application by reducing the required amount of calculation. An algorithm for general problems is described.
(2) 2. Bayesian decision theory with imprecise prior probabilities Decision problems (Lindley, 1990) can, with a good deal of generality, be described as follows. Let X be the sample space of points x and e the parameter space of points a. These are connected by p(xla), the probability density of X for a given a (with respect to some measure). Let D be the decision space of points d, and L(d,a) the loss in selecting d when a obtains (we assume L(d,a)eR for all d and a). The Bayesian approach uses a prior probability density n(a) over parameter space e and chooses as the optimum decision that d which minimizes the expected loss
e where p(alx) is the posterior probability density of a, given x, obtained by Bayes' theorem. If no data x are available, the decision can be based on the prior, in which case the optimum decision is that d which minimizes the expected loss
e Without loss of generality we work with (2), since the posterior at one stage is just the prior for the next (eoolen, 1992a,1993) .
Suppose that the probability density n(a) is not known precisely, but is only known to belong to a space TI of probability densities. This generalization is known in literature as imprecise (prior) probabilities (Walley, 1991) . In contrast to a hierarchical Bayesian approach we do not define a probability density over TI. Assuming the loss function L(d,a) is known, the expected loss for neTI and deD is 
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The second and third equality are based on lemma 3.1, the fourth on lemma 3.2. The other equalities follow from (4), (5), (20), (21) and (22).
The proof of (27) is analogous. c
In theorem 3.1 restriction (9) needs to be satisfied. Of course loss functions that do not satisfy this restriction can be of interest, so the above theory needs to be generalized. We first consider what happens if restriction (9) is not satisfied, so if
e (d,u) u and (17) such that
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The inequality is proved analogously to the proof of lemma 3.2.
The proof of (47) 
We prove (54).
The second and third equality are based on lemma 3.3, the fourth on lemma 3.4. The other equalities follow from (4), (5), (48), (49) and (50).
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for which one has to replace the partitions of e but for which analogous relations as (74) appear. This completes the proof of (69), as
The proof of (70) is quite similar to that of (69). Let u,~E [L1, d, Lu, d] with~> u and let q =q =0, then analogous relations as (73) are used to up rove that:
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, u, Again the proof is analogous for the other three possible combinations of qu and q , for which one has to replace the partitions of e but for which w analogous relations as (76) appear. This completes the proof of (70), again by use of (75).
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In (97) k 1 (~) is a continuous non-increasing function of~, with d,L u ,d) for which k 1 (~O) = k2(~O)' which proves (95).
The proof of (96) unbounded, we must define bounds such that the integral over the bounded subspace is a good approximation of the integral over e. This is a standard method of numerical integration.
Quite informally an algorithm for the determination of g~(d,n) for a decision deD can be described by the following steps (given d): ) by thẽ~~,~, q sum of these terms divided by the sum of the u(8,) and £(8.) used herein. IfL (d,8,) =~, then we have to perform two calculations, one using u(8,) and onẽũ sing £(8.), and afterwards take the largest of the corresponding results. is not yet found, repeat steps 2 and 3 until the maximum is found (or an approximation) .
During this calculation of g~(d,n) we can also perform the necessary steps to calculate g~(d,n).
To end this section, we present a simple example of the above theory. The fact that the optima are equal to the values of -1. 9 for which these optima are adopted is in agreement with theorem 3.4.
